Skip to content Skip to footer

Background to the Solicitation

HP Inc. (“HP” or the “Company”) evaluates on an ongoing basis its business strategy, capital allocation, and potential strategic alternatives in an effort to drive shareholder value. This evaluation is iterative, and takes into account the perspectives of the Company’s shareholders, whose views are actively sought through the Company’s robust shareholder engagement program.

In the summer of 2018 following Xerox Holdings Corporation’s (“Xerox”) termination of the Fuji-Xerox merger agreement and the appointment of John Visentin as the chief executive office of Xerox, HP and Xerox held intermittent discussions concerning the possibility of potential joint business initiatives including, in particular, the possibility that HP would serve as a manufacturer of equipment to be sold by Xerox (the “OEM Arrangement”). These discussions were led by Steve Bandrowczak, Xerox’s president and chief operations officer, and Enrique Lores, then head of HP’s printing division. Discussions concerning the OEM Arrangement were commercial and friendly, and did result in commercial arrangements. These discussions continued throughout 2019. In the course of these discussions, Mr. Bandrowczak said on a number of occasions that Xerox wanted to be acquired by HP and sought Mr. Lores’ thoughts on that issue, and Mr. Lores replied that it was premature to contemplate that, and first the companies should get to know one another better through the OEM Arrangement and other possible joint business initiatives that could make sense.

On June 25, 2019, following an extensive corporate strategy process led by Enrique Lores, the board of directors of HP (“HP Board”) reviewed and approved an updated corporate strategy proposal that included, among other things, the pursuit of potential acquisition targets in the Print business. The HP Board subsequently reviewed and discussed considerations for a number of potential targets, including Xerox.

On August 12, 2019, Carl Icahn, the largest shareholder of Xerox, phoned Dion Weisler, HP’s then-chief executive officer. Based on publicly reported information, HP believed that Mr. Icahn was the beneficial owner of approximately 10.6% of Xerox’s outstanding common stock at such time. Mr. Icahn communicated that he believed HP was a well-run company with a strong management team and stated that he had accumulated approximately 60 million shares of HP common stock, constituting 4.125% of HP’s then-outstanding shares of common stock. Mr. Icahn further expressed his belief that there was considerable value in combining Xerox and HP, that HP should consider buying Xerox (or, if not, that Mr. Icahn would consider making an offer to acquire HP) and that he wanted a transaction to occur quickly. Mr. Weisler expressed that HP was always open to hearing from its shareholders and that the HP Board was focused on creating shareholder value. Following the call, on August 13, 2019, Mr. Icahn sent Mr. Weisler an e-mail attaching two Xerox slides showing estimated synergies of $3.5 billion that a combined company could achieve with full impact in 2023.

On August 22, 2019, the Company announced that Mr. Weisler had decided to step down for a family health matter and that the HP Board had unanimously appointed Mr. Lores (then head of HP’s printing division) to succeed Mr. Weisler as the Company’s chief executive officer effective November 1, 2019.

On August 23, 2019, Mr. Bandrowczak called Mr. Lores (then head of HP’s printing division) and advised that Mr. Visentin was planning to tell Mr. Weisler that Xerox was very interested in a combination with HP at an upcoming, previously-scheduled breakfast meeting. On August 26, 2019, Mr. Icahn called Mr. Weisler and expressed that he was focused on quickly pursuing a combination of HP with Xerox and asked Mr. Weisler for his views on HP buying Xerox. Mr. Weisler expressed to Mr. Icahn that HP would require further information from Xerox in order to assess a potential acquisition and that he would follow up directly with Mr. Visentin. Later that day, Mr. Weisler sent Mr. Visentin a list of threshold questions that would need to be addressed by Xerox before HP would engage in full discussions concerning an acquisition of Xerox. These questions related to topics including synergy calculations, Xerox’s “Project Own It” restructuring initiative, Xerox’s intellectual property, Xerox’s plans for its financing subsidiary, regulatory matters, Xerox’s joint venture with Fujifilm Holdings and the litigation between Xerox and Fujifilm, and the impact of a potential transaction on Xerox’s critical contracts.

On August 27, 2019, Mr. Visentin phoned Mr. Weisler and stated that Xerox was eager to combine with HP, and that he hoped that HP would include stock consideration in any offer to acquire Xerox. He also stated that he knew that Mr. Icahn had taken an ownership position in HP. Mr. Visentin advised that Xerox would provide HP with the information HP had requested.

On September 4, 2019, Mr. Weisler and Mr. Visentin had their previously-scheduled breakfast meeting. At the meeting, Mr. Visentin stated that, strategically, Xerox’s Board believed that Xerox was out of organic growth opportunities and must either grow through a strategic acquisition or be acquired. He informed Mr. Weisler that Xerox had offered to buy Fujifilm Holdings Corporation’s (“Fuji”) interest in their joint venture, but Fuji had declined to enter into negotiations. Mr. Visentin further stated that Xerox could try to acquire HP, but that the extreme leverage that Xerox would need to take on to make such an acquisition and the resulting potential for a credit downgrade made it preferable for HP to acquire Xerox. Mr. Visentin expressed a preference for HP to use its stock as acquisition currency, but said that cash could also be acceptable. Mr. Weisler expressed that HP was attempting to evaluate a potential transaction, but was still awaiting the requested information from Xerox that was necessary to conduct even a preliminary evaluation of a potential transaction, and without that information, HP could not determine next steps. Mr. Weisler reiterated that HP remained open to all value-creating options.

During late August/early September 2019, Kim Rivera, HP’s president of strategy and business management and chief legal officer, worked with Louie Pastor, Xerox’s executive vice president and general counsel, to coordinate a follow-up meeting between a few high level executives from their respective companies, which ultimately resulted in a meeting on September 12, 2019.

On September 12, 2019, there was an in-person meeting between selected senior management of HP and selected senior management of Xerox. Neither company’s chief executive officer was present. At the meeting, Xerox shared a slide presentation regarding, among other things, selected contractual provisions to which it was subject; the progress of Xerox’s cost cutting program, which it referred to as Project Own-It; and potential synergies of a combined HP-Xerox. Two of the slides discussing potential synergies were substantially identical to those provided to Mr. Weisler by Mr. Icahn on August 13, 2019. The slides included an illustrative valuation analysis of an acquisition of Xerox for $40-46 per share in cash and showing $3.5 billion of cost synergies achieved by 2022.

Overall, the level of information provided by Xerox was largely equivalent to Xerox’s December 9, 2019 investor presentation. “Synergy” estimates were large, round numbers without the detail required to validate that they had a sound basis. Notably, questions raised by HP about the current trajectory of the Xerox business (including but not limited to questions raised in response to the review of the materials presented by Xerox and as part of the discussion relating to the goals and results of Project Own It, which HP management believed were important in order to properly contextualize and understand trends in Xerox’s business and its publicly reported financial results) were deferred and not addressed.

On September 27, 2019, Mr. Visentin had a telephone conversation with Mr. Weisler. Mr. Visentin pressed Mr. Weisler regarding next steps. Mr. Weisler emphasized that HP required the threshold information that it had requested in order to make any determinations. Mr. Visentin said that he would attempt to facilitate the provision of that information.

On October 1, 2019, a few high-level executives from Xerox and HP participated in a video conference. Prior to the meeting, HP had shared a list of questions with Xerox and identified them as topics that HP would like to address at the meeting. The questions related to topics including Xerox’s business mix, financial performance, strategy and trajectory, Xerox’s joint venture with Fujifilm Holdings and the litigation between Xerox and Fujifilm, and compliance matters. At the meeting, the representatives of Xerox pressed the representatives of HP as to why HP required due diligence in order to make an offer to acquire Xerox. The representatives of Xerox then provided limited information with respect to plans for Xerox’s ownership interest in its joint venture with Fuji, synergies and certain other topics. Again, notably, questions raised by HP about the fundamental health and trajectory of Xerox’s business were deferred and not addressed.

On October 4, 2019, Mr. Weisler spoke with Mr. Visentin. Mr. Weisler confirmed that HP was prepared to enter into a non-disclosure agreement with Xerox and to commit time and resources to further explore a business combination, if Xerox would be willing to begin sharing substantive information with HP. Mr. Visentin stated that Xerox required HP to make an indicative offer, including the price (or price range) to acquire Xerox, before Xerox would continue the discussions. Mr. Weisler stated that HP could not specify a price without the previously requested threshold information, given HP’s concerns regarding Xerox’s business and the limited information that had been provided to date. Mr. Visentin agreed to present to the Xerox board of directors HP’s proposal to execute a non-disclosure agreement relating to the receipt of additional substantive information from Xerox.

On October 10, 2019, Mr. Visentin confirmed that Xerox was unwilling to provide any substantive information without an indicative offer price from HP. Mr. Weisler again confirmed that HP was prepared to commit the requisite time and resources to a focused, expeditious process to inform its valuation of a potential combination, if Xerox was willing to provide the threshold diligence information previously discussed. Mr. Visentin informed Mr. Weisler that Xerox was not willing and, therefore, discussions were at an end.

In the evening of November 5, 2019, Mr. Visentin contacted Mr. Weisler to inform him that Xerox’s Board had approved an offer for Xerox to acquire HP for consideration comprised of $17.00 in cash and 0.137 shares of Xerox common stock per share of HP common stock (the “November Proposal”). Mr. Visentin also stated that Xerox had received a highly confident letter from Citibank with respect to the required financing. That same evening, reports of the November Proposal appeared in the Wall Street Journal. Mr. Visentin sent a letter containing the November Proposal to Mr. Lores that evening by email.

On November 6, 2019, HP publicly confirmed that a proposal had been received from Xerox.

On November 8, 2019, a telephone conversation between Mr. Icahn, Mr. Lores and Mr. Weisler was arranged at Mr. Icahn’s request to Mr. Weisler. At Mr. Icahn’s suggestion, Keith Cozza, the Chairman of the Board of Xerox and Mr. Icahn’s employee, also joined the call. Mr. Icahn informed Mr. Weisler and Mr. Lores that he believed that HP and Xerox should move to combine swiftly in a transaction in which Mr. Icahn would receive stock of the combined company, and that if HP was unwilling to do that, Xerox and Mr. Icahn were prepared to escalate the situation. Mr. Lores informed Mr. Icahn that HP’s Board had received and was evaluating the November Proposal, and reiterated that HP had remained willing to continue discussions about the potential of a strategic combination of the two companies before Xerox terminated discussions due to its refusal to share any substantive information. On the same day, Mr. Weisler and Mr. Lores had a similar telephone conversation with Mr. Visentin.

On November 13, 2019, Mr. Lores phoned Mr. Icahn. Mr. Lores informed Mr. Icahn that HP was considering the November Proposal. Mr. Icahn reiterated that he believed that there was significant value from a combination between Xerox and HP, and that he was open to alternative transaction structures. That same evening, Mr. Icahn was quoted in an article in the Wall Street Journal as being in favor of a combination of Xerox and HP; in that article, Mr. Icahn publicly disclosed his ownership of approximately 4.24% of HP’s then-outstanding common stock.

Also on November 13, 2019, the HP Board met to evaluate the November Proposal. The HP Board considered its financial advisor’s analysis of the November Proposal. The HP Board further considered that there remained significant unanswered questions relating to: (1) potential value creation that could arise from a combination of Xerox and HP, given the lack of access to substantive information that would be required to evaluate the quantum of synergies that a deal might create; (2) the future business trajectory of Xerox, given the recent deterioration in Xerox’s business; (3) Xerox’s ability to finance a deal with investment grade notes, given Xerox’s current non-investment grade ratings from all three major rating agencies (Ba1 with negative outlook from Moody’s, BB+ with negative outlook from S&P, and BB from Fitch); and (4) the potential impact of outsized debt levels on the combined company’s stock. The HP Board determined that the November Proposal significantly undervalued HP relative to the Company’s standalone plan and options to deploy its strong balance sheet to generate shareholder value, and that rejecting the November Proposal was in the best interests of HP’s shareholders. The HP Board instructed Mr. Lores to convey its rejection of the November Proposal to Xerox and to reiterate that HP was open to exploring a potential combination, but still needed answers to its threshold questions to proceed further.

On November 14, 2019, Mr. Lores and Mr. Visentin spoke by telephone. Mr. Lores informed Mr. Visentin that Mr. Lores had spoken to Mr. Icahn, and informed him that HP planned to respond to Xerox’s proposal in the coming days. Mr. Visentin informed Mr. Lores that Xerox’s offer would remain open following the November 13, 2019 date stated in the letter conveying the November Proposal, and subsequently sent Mr. Lores an email confirming that Xerox would extend the time period for HP to respond to the offer until the end of the day on November 18, 2019.

On November 17, 2019, the HP Board sent the following letter to Mr. Visentin:

Dear John,

Our Board of Directors has reviewed and considered your unsolicited proposal dated November 5, 2019 at a meeting with our financial and legal advisors and has unanimously concluded that it significantly undervalues HP and is not in the best interests of HP shareholders. In reaching this determination, the Board also considered the highly conditional and uncertain nature of the proposal, including the potential impact of outsized debt levels on the combined company’s stock.

We have great confidence in our strategy and our ability to execute to continue driving sustainable long-term value at HP. In addition, the Board and management team continue to take actions to enhance shareholder value including the deployment of our strong balance sheet for increased repurchases of our significantly undervalued stock and for value-creating M&A.

We recognize the potential benefits of consolidation, and we are open to exploring whether there is value to be created for HP shareholders through a potential combination with Xerox. However, as we have previously shared in connection with our prior requests for diligence, we have fundamental questions that need to be addressed in our diligence of Xerox. We note the decline of Xerox’s revenue from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, which raises significant questions for us regarding the trajectory of your business and future prospects. In addition, we believe it is critical to engage in a rigorous analysis of the achievable synergies from a potential combination. With substantive engagement from Xerox management and access to diligence information on Xerox, we believe that we can quickly evaluate the merits of a potential transaction.

We remain ready to engage with you to better understand your business and any value to be created from a combination.

On behalf of the Board of Directors,

/s/ Enrique Lores and Chip Bergh

Also on November 17, 2019, Mr. Lores had a telephone conversation with Mr. Visentin, and multiple conversations with Mr. Icahn, regarding HP’s response to the November Proposal. Mr. Lores told Mr. Visentin and Mr. Icahn that HP continued to stand ready to do due diligence on Xerox in order to assess a potential strategic combination. Each of Mr. Visentin and Mr. Icahn separately encouraged a mutual due diligence process and conveyed that Xerox was likely unwilling to proceed with one-way diligence by HP and might pursue a proxy contest to elect directors to HP’s Board instead. Mr. Icahn suggested that, if HP wanted a consensual resolution, HP should make an offer to acquire Xerox and suggested that $45 per share might be an attractive price if HP were to do so.

On November 20, 2019, Mr. Visentin informed Mr. Lores that Xerox would respond to HP the following day. Mr. Visentin stated that Xerox would be insisting on mutual due diligence before a deal could move forward.

On November 21, 2019, Mr. Visentin sent a letter to Mr. Lores and Chip Bergh, Chairman of the Board of HP, and publicly released such letter. In the letter, Mr. Visentin stated that if HP did not agree to mutual confirmatory due diligence by Monday, November 25, 2019, Xerox would take steps to present its November Proposal directly to HP shareholders. On the same day, there were telephone conversations between Mr. Lores and Mr. Visentin to reiterate the letter sent by Mr. Visentin to Mr. Lores and Mr. Bergh on that day.

On November 23 and 24, 2019, the HP Board held a telephonic meeting during which it reviewed and considered Xerox’s November 21, 2019 letter. The HP Board considered that Xerox’s offer had not changed and, accordingly, still significantly undervalued HP. The HP Board further considered the impetus for Xerox’s perceived urgency to reach a transaction, the HP Board’s questions about Xerox’s standalone prospects, and the fact that Xerox’s requested timing would not permit the Company to perform due diligence to the extent that the HP Board considered necessary in order to assess the potential impact of a transaction on HP shareholders.

Also on November 24, 2019, and following separate conversations between Mr. Lores and Mr. Visentin and Mr. Lores and Mr. Icahn in which Mr. Lores informed Mr. Visentin and Mr. Icahn of HP’s response to the November 21 letter, Mr. Lores and Mr. Bergh responded to Mr. Visentin’s November 21, 2019 letter on behalf of the HP Board with the following letter:

Dear John,

The HP Board of Directors has reviewed and considered your November 21 letter, which has provided no new information beyond your November 5 letter. We reiterate that we reject Xerox’s proposal as it significantly undervalues HP. Additionally, it is highly conditional and uncertain. In particular, there continues to be uncertainty regarding Xerox’s ability to raise the cash portion of the proposed consideration and concerns regarding the prudence of the resulting outsized debt burden on the value of the combined company’s stock even if the financing were obtained. Consequently, your proposal does not constitute a basis for due diligence or negotiation.

We believe it is important to emphasize that we are not dependent on a Xerox combination. We have great confidence in our strategy and the numerous opportunities available to HP to drive sustainable long-term value, including the deployment of our strong balance sheet for increased share repurchases of our significantly undervalued stock and for value-creating M&A.

It is clear in your aggressive words and actions that Xerox is intent on forcing a potential combination on opportunistic terms and without providing adequate information. When we were in private discussions with you in August and September, we repeatedly raised our questions; you failed to address them and instead walked away, choosing to pursue a hostile approach rather than continue down a more productive path. But these fundamental issues have not gone away, and your now-public urgency to accelerate toward a deal, still without addressing these questions, only heightens our concern about your business and prospects. Accordingly, we must have due diligence to determine whether a Xerox combination has any merit.

We remain prepared to study the potential value of a combination and to work quickly to learn more about your business trajectory. However, there are significant concerns about both the near-term health and long-term viability of your business that have a significant impact on Xerox’s value. The question of whether there is a path to turn around your business is a threshold issue. In addition to the visible and substantial declines at Xerox, our specific concerns include:

  • Xerox has missed consensus revenue estimates in four of the last five quarters;

  •  Xerox’s revenue has fallen from $10.2 billion to $9.2 billion (on a trailing 12-month basis) since June 2018, and this is expected to continue – Xerox management projects revenue declines of 6% in fiscal 2019;

  • Given how much of your business is based on contractual revenue, we are concerned about the decline in customer Total Contract Value (TCV) in excess of revenue declines, which suggests your revenues may decline even faster in future years. We note that the TCV of enterprise signings (including renewals) in 2018 was down 13.9% in constant currency and your churn for 2018 was 18%, both data points which Xerox has stopped providing publicly since the end of 2018;

  • Our review of synergies based on public information and the limited information you have shared does not support achievable synergies of the scale you suggest, and it appears that your assumptions include significant savings that are already included in each company’s independently announced cost reduction plans; and

  • It appears to us that when Xerox exited the Fujifilm joint venture, Xerox essentially mortgaged its future for a short-term cash infusion. We fear that the exit has left a sizeable strategic hole in Xerox’s portfolio. In addition, we have concerns as to the state of Xerox’s technology resources, research and development pipeline, future product programs, and supply continuity and capability. Finally, we note that Xerox will have to get access to the fastest growing Asia Pacific region.

The HP Board of Directors is committed to serving the best interests of HP shareholders, not Xerox and its shareholders. HP has numerous opportunities to create value for HP shareholders on a standalone basis. We will not let aggressive tactics or hostile gestures distract us from our responsibility to pursue the most value-creating path.

On behalf of the Board of Directors,

/s/ Enrique Lores and Chip Bergh

On November 26, 2019, Mr. Visentin sent a letter to Mr. Lores and Mr. Bergh, in response to the letter sent by Mr. Lores and Mr. Bergh on November 24, 2019. Mr. Visentin stated that Xerox planned to engage directly with HP shareholders to solicit their support for the November Proposal. This letter was made public on the date it was sent to HP.

On December 4, 2019, Mr. Icahn published an open letter to HP’s shareholders criticizing HP’s decision not to engage in mutual due diligence.

On December 9, 2019, Xerox filed a publicly available presentation advocating for the November 6 proposal.

On December 17, 2019, Moody’s Investors Service issued a credit opinion update that reflected uncertainty about Xerox’s ability to stabilize and grow its revenue base over the next few years. Moody’s stated that the transaction contemplated by the November Proposal would lead to higher leverage, significant costs to realize synergies, and significant execution risks. Moody’s also stated that it believed that Xerox’s credit profile could be pressured if the transaction was consummated.

On January 6, 2020, Mr. Visentin sent a letter to Mr. Lores and Mr. Bergh (which was also made public) stating that Xerox had obtained financing commitments in connection with the November Proposal from Citigroup Global Markets Inc, Mizuho Bank, Ltd. and Bank of America, N.A.

On January 8, 2020, Mr. Lores and Mr. Bergh, on behalf of HP’s Board, sent the following letter to Mr. Visentin responding to his January 6, 2020 letter:

Dear John,

We reiterate that the HP Board of Directors’ focus is on driving sustainable long-term value for HP shareholders. Your letter dated January 6, 2020 regarding financing does not address the key issue – that Xerox’s proposal significantly undervalues HP – and is not a basis for discussion. The HP Board of Directors remains committed to advancing the best interests of all HP shareholders and to pursuing the most value-creating opportunities.

On behalf of the Board of Directors,

/s/ Enrique Lores and Chip Bergh

On January 23, 2020, Xerox submitted to HP a notice of the nomination of 11 directors and four alternate director nominees for election to the HP Board at the Company’s 2020 annual meeting. Xerox made a public announcement of its intention to nominate candidates to the HP Board on the same day.

Further on January 23, 2020, HP issued a statement in response to Xerox’s announcement of its intention to nominate directors for election to the HP Board at the Company’s 2020 annual meeting providing that the HP Board believes “that the nominations are a self-serving tactic by Xerox to advance its proposal that significantly undervalues HP and creates meaningful risk to the detriment of HP shareholders.”

On February 10, 2020, Xerox announced its intention to launch a tender offer on or around March 2, 2020, for all of the outstanding shares of common stock of HP at a nominal price of $24.00 per share, to be comprised of $18.40 in cash and 0.149 Xerox shares for each HP share (the “Revised Proposal”). Xerox stated that, while it did not have financing sufficient to fund the Revised Proposal, it was in discussions regarding a sale of convertible securities.

On February 11, 2020, HP announced the release date for its earnings for the first fiscal quarter of 2020 would be February 24; that it would present additional information about its long-term strategic plans at such time; and that it wants its shareholders to have full information on the earnings and the value inherent in the Company before responding to Xerox’s February 10 press release.

On February 20, 2020, given Xerox’s announcement that it intended to commence a tender offer to acquire all of the outstanding shares of HP common stock, HP adopted and announced a limited shareholder rights plan that expires on February 20, 2021, and declared a dividend of one preferred share purchase right for each outstanding share of HP common stock to stockholders of record on March 2, 2020.

In the event that a person or group acquires beneficial ownership of 20% or more of HP’s then outstanding common stock, subject to certain exceptions, each right would entitle its holder (other than such person or members of such group) to purchase additional shares of HP common stock at a substantial discount to the public market price. In addition, at any time after a person or group acquires 20% or more of HP’s outstanding common stock (unless such person or group acquires 50% or more), the HP Board may exchange one share of HP common stock for each outstanding right (other than rights owned by such person or group, which would have become void). The shareholder rights plan could make it more difficult for a third party to acquire HP or a large block of HP’s common stock without the approval of the Board.

HP adopted the shareholder rights plan because the HP Board believed that it would be essential that HP shareholders have sufficient time and full information when considering any tender offer that Xerox may commence. Following the commencement of the exchange offer by Xerox on March 2, 2020, the HP Board reaffirmed the shareholder rights plan and the maintenance of the rights to contribute to the preservation of HP’s long-term value for its stockholders, including in light of the commencement of the exchange offer.

On February 21, 2020, a friend of Mr. Icahn suggested to Mr. Bergh, the Chairman of the HP Board, that the two discuss the situation; and on February 22, 2020, Mr. Icahn and a colleague from Icahn Associates spoke with Mr. Bergh and Mr. Robert Bennett, another member of the HP Board. Mr. Bergh had not previously spoken or emailed with Mr. Icahn, and has never spoken with or otherwise had contact with Mr. Visentin. The conversation was cordial. Messrs. Bergh and Bennett stated that they were primarily there to listen and were interested to hear the views of Mr. Icahn on the situation in that HP was in a “quiet period” with earnings to be released on February 24. Mr. Icahn’s views were generally the same as had been reported in the news media the same day, including his perspective on management structure. Messrs. Bergh and Bennett indicated that their focus was HP shareholder value, especially in light of the significant amount of equity to be held by HP shareholders in any combination; that HP was a very large complex and global group of businesses relative to Xerox where failure to execute well on the business plan could have negative consequences on a scale greater than the value of Xerox; and that they had significant confidence in the HP team’s ability to reduce costs in the business judiciously while also executing the plan across the size and breadth of HP’s businesses over time.

On February 24, 2020, HP announced its earnings for the first fiscal quarter of 2020 and announced a new strategic and financial value plan including new 3-year financial targets and a new capital return plan. In connection with that, HP announced that the revised Xerox proposal announced on February 10 meaningfully undervalues HP, creates significant risk and compromises the future of the company. HP also announced that HP was reaching out to Xerox to explore if there is a combination that creates value for HP shareholders that is additive to HP’s strategic and financial plan. At the same time, Mr. Lores sent an email to Mr. Visentin proposing to arrange a meeting to explore the basis for a transaction and alternative transaction frameworks that could deliver attractive value to both HP and Xerox shareholders, and offering that Mr. Lores’ office would reach out to Mr. Visentin’s office to arrange a time to discuss. Such meeting was held on March 10, 2020 in New York.

On March 2, 2020, Xerox commenced an exchange offer to acquire all outstanding shares of HP common stock.

****************

The Board currently consists of 13 Directors. On the recommendation of the Nominating, Governance and Social Responsibility Committee, the Board has nominated the 12 persons named below for election as Directors this year, each to serve for a one-year term and until the Director’s successor is elected and qualified or, if earlier, until his or her resignation or removal. Mr. Weisler is not standing for re-election at this annual meeting, and the Board has determined that the size of the Board will be reduced to 12 Directors at the time of the annual meeting.

Our Board recommends using the enclosed WHITE proxy card to vote FOR the election of all of the Board’s 12 Director nominees listed below.

Xerox has notified us of its intent to nominate a slate of 12 nominees for election as Directors at the annual meeting in opposition to the nominees proposed by our Board. Our Board does not endorse any Xerox nominee and unanimously recommends that you disregard any blue proxy card that may be sent to you by Xerox. Voting to “withhold” with respect to any of Xerox’s nominees on its proxy card is not the same as voting FOR our Board’s nominees, because a vote to “withhold” with respect to any of Xerox’s nominees on its proxy card will revoke any previous proxy submitted by you, including any vote you may have made for our Board’s nominees. If you have previously voted using a blue proxy card sent to you by Xerox, you may change your vote by voting via the Internet or by telephone by following the easy instructions provided on the enclosed WHITE proxy card. You may also sign, date and return the enclosed WHITE proxy card to the address indicated on the card, but we strongly encourage you to use this option only if you do not have access to a touch-tone telephone or to the Internet. Only the latest validly executed proxy that you submit will be counted.

Return to top
© 2020 HP Development Company, L.P.